Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information

Bruno Jullien and Alessandro Pavan

Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users’ preferences. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns affecting the agents’ ability to estimate their own as well as other agents’ valuations, and product design affecting the distribution of valuations on the two sides of the market.

Keywords: two-sided markets; dispersed information; platform competition; global-games; informative advertising JEL Classification: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information (2013)
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