Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading

Carsten Helm and Stefan Pichler ()

No V-341-11, Working Papers from University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for industrialized countries as long as they are permit buyers, and as long as they can target subsidies to additional" investments. We also consider how TT a ects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it reduces overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.

Keywords: emissions trading; technology transfer; international climate policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D78 H41 O38 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2011-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Oldenburg Working Papers V-341-11

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.vwl.uni-oldenburg.de/download/DP_V-341_11.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading (2015)
Working Paper: Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:old:dpaper:341

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