Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading

Carsten Helm and Stefan Pichler ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 60, issue 1, 37-54

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Keywords: Emissions trading; Technology transfer; International climate policy; Additionality; Subsidies; D62; D78; H41; O38; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading (2014)
Working Paper: Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6

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