Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof
Anne van den Nouweland ()
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Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department
I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
JEL-codes: C72 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2007-12
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