Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof

A. van den Nouweland

No 1003, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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