Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof

Anne van den Nouweland ()
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Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon and The University of Melbourne

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 43, 1-6

Abstract: I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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