Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

David Gill

No 211, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results. We find that despite the help that disclosure can give to a rival, the leading innovator sometimes chooses to disclose. Disclosure signals commitment to the research project, which may induce a rival to exit. With weak product market competition, the leader discloses intermediate results that are sufficiently promising, while secrecy may be employed for very good results. As spillovers from disclosure increase, the leader becomes more secretive. With strong product market competition, the leader may rely entirely on secrecy but perhaps surprisingly invests more often at the intermediate stage.

Keywords: Disclosure; Intermediate Research Results; Spillovers; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 L19 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:211

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