Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity

David Gill, Victoria Prowse and Michael Vlassopoulos

No 666, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. These results are consistent with workers' cheating behavior responding to the perceived fairness of their employer's compensation scheme.

Keywords: Bonus; compensation; cheating dishonesty; lying; employee crime; productivity; slider task; real effort; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-eff, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity (2013)
Working Paper: Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity (2013)
Working Paper: Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Bonuses and Productivity (2012)
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