Error Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity in Public-Good Games
Lise Vesterlund ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maria P. Recalde ()
No 5662, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
Higher contributions by fast decision-makers in public-good games may not resultfrom greater generosity but from mistakes. In several public-good games we vary the location ofthe unique dominant strategy equilibrium. In games with interior equilibria the correlationbetween response time and contributions is negative when the equilibrium lies below themidpoint of the strategy space, but positive when it lies above the midpoint. Fast decisionmakersare also found less generous in simple constant-return public-good games with a fullprovisionequilibrium. In all investigated public-good games fast decision-makers are largelyinsensitive to incentives and more often make mistakes.1
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Journal Article: Error-prone inference from response time: The case of intuitive generosity in public-good games (2018)
Working Paper: Error Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity in Public Good Times (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pit:wpaper:5662
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