Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale

Marco Pagnozzi and Krista Saral

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market. There is always one positive-value bidder, and either one to two speculators who may choose whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction

Keywords: speculators; entry; multi-object auctions; resale; economic experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70022/1/MPRA_paper_70022.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale (2019)
Working Paper: Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale (2019)
Working Paper: Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:70022

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().