Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale
Marco Pagnozzi () and
Krista Saral ()
CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy
We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market, with one positive-value bidder, and either one or two speculators who may choose simultaneously whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction.
Keywords: speculators; entry; multi-object auctions; resale; economic experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
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Forthcoming in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article: Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale (2019)
Working Paper: Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale (2019)
Working Paper: Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:475
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