Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity

Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these cooperative solutions.

Keywords: Differential Information; risky core; ambiguous core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2020)
Working Paper: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76428

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