Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
Emma Moreno-García and
Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez ()
Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics
We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these cooperative solutions.
Pages: 19 pages
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Working Paper: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp438
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