Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity

Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these cooperative solutions.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2017-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2020)
Working Paper: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2017)
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