Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity

Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 69, issue 1, No 4, 125-147

Abstract: Abstract We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware of the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, when joining a coalition, each consumer considers the informational risk and may be uncertain about the prior relevant to her decision. In this context, we introduce cooperative solutions that we refer to as risky core, ambiguous core, and meu-core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these concepts, including their coalitional incentive compatibility. We also formalize the intuition that the blocking power of coalitions is increasing with their information but decreasing with the degree of risk or ambiguity aversion faced by their members.

Keywords: Differential information; Risky core; Ambiguous core; meu-core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2017)
Working Paper: Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1159-z

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