Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

David Gill and Yaroslav Rosokha

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, beliefs respond to the return to cooperation, most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, and beliefs change with experience while becoming more accurate over time. Finally, we uncover a novel mechanism whereby trusting subjects learn to cooperate through their interaction with experience.

Pages: 108 pages
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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https://business.purdue.edu/research/working-paper ... okha_0523_public.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2024)
Working Paper: Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2022)
Working Paper: Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1332

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