Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

David Gill and Yaroslav Rosokha

No 15492, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, initial beliefs match behavior quite well, most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, and beliefs respond to experience while becoming more accurate over time. Finally, we uncover a novel mechanism whereby trusting subjects learn to cooperate through their interaction with experience.

Keywords: belief elicitation; optimism; cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; supergame strategies; experimentation; trust; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 100 pages
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-neu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2024, 16 (3), 259– 283

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Related works:
Journal Article: Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2024)
Working Paper: Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (2023)
Working Paper: Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (2020)
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