Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions

Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge's attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can a ect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring e ects in the setting of damages, decoy e ects in choice of legal remedies, and framing e ects in the decision to litigate. The model also o ers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2015)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2015)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qsh:wpaper:132951

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