Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions

Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer

No 19695, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge's attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can effect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy effects in choice of legal remedies, and framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.

JEL-codes: D03 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
Note: LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2015. "Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages S7 - S33.

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Journal Article: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2015)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2015)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions
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