Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions

Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, vol. 44, issue S1, S7 - S33

Abstract: We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge's attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can affect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence that bears on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy effects in choice of legal remedies, and framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2015)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions (2013)
Working Paper: Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions
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