Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field
Florian Englmaier () and
Stephen Leider ()
No 178, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker\'s effort on the manager\'s payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent\'s ability to \"repay the gift\". We control for differences in ability and reciprocal inclination and show that gift-exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents. We present a principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates our findings. Our results help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift-exchange outside the lab.
Keywords: incentives; field experiments; gift-exchange; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Journal Article: Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field (2020)
Working Paper: Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:178
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