The Iron Curtain and Referee Bias in International Football

Dmitry Dagaev, Sofiia Paklina, J Reade and Carl Singleton

No em-dp2021-14, Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Reading

Abstract: Using the assignment of referees to European international association football matches played between 2002 and 2016, we ask whether judgements were biased according to the legacy of the Cold War. We find that referees from post-communist states favoured teams from non-communist states, but there was no evidence of favouritism in the other direction. This out-group bias of referees born behind the Iron Curtain was statistically significant for relatively less important and more subjective decisions, namely the awarding of yellow cards for foul play. The bias was particularly large among referees from the former Soviet Union. It has also diminished over time, perhaps due to increased professionalism in European refereeing, or because memories of the Cold War era have diminished among active referees.

Keywords: home advantage; social pressure; international relations; sports economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 F59 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2021-08-02, Revised 2023-04-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Iron Curtain and Referee Bias in International Football (2024)
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