Social Discounting and Incentive Compatible Fiscal Policy

Catarina Reis ()

No 413, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which the government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is more impatient than households, the capital income tax will always be positive in steady state. Furthermore, the steady state to which the economy converges is independent of initial conditions. Numerical simulations suggest that as the difference between private and public discounting increases, the level of the steady state capital tax and public debt also become higher.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2009/paper_413.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:413

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().