Incentives and the Structure of Teams

Matt Mitchell, Galina Vereshchagina and April Franco
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Matt Mitchell: University of Toronto;

No 758, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: may, on their own, generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities or anti-complementarities in production technology. We also derive sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model leading to the optimality of positive and negative matching of team members.

Date: 2009
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Journal Article: Incentives and the structure of teams (2011)
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