Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy

Francisco Ferreira and Filipe Campante

No 483, Textos para discussão from Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil)

Abstract: This paper analyses the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment. We first show that the Pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency games in static exchange economies no longer holds under these more general conditions. We construct a model of pressure groups where the set of e.cient truthful common-agency equilibria has measure zero. Equilibria are generally inefficient as a direct result of the existence of groups with conflicting interests, which allocate real resources to lobbying. If lobbies representing "the poor " and "the rich " have identical organizational capacities, we show that these equilibria are biased towards the poor, who have a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. If the pressure groups di.er in their organizational capacity, both pro-rich (oligarchic) and pro-poor (populist) equilibria may arise, all of which are inefficient with respect to the constrained optimum.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lam and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy (2007)
Working Paper: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy (2007)
Working Paper: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy (2004)
Working Paper: Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rio:texdis:483

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