Emiliano Catonini and
Jingyi Xue ()
Additional contact information
Jingyi Xue: School of Economics, Singapore Management University
No 1-2021, Economics and Statistics Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics
We define a local notion of weak dominance that speaks to the true choice problems among actions in a game tree and does not necessarily require to plan optimally for the future. A strategy is (globally) weakly dominant if and only if it prescribes a locally weakly dominant action at every decision node it reaches, and in this case local weak dominance is characterized by a (wishful-thinking) condition that requires no forward planning. From this local perspective, we identify form of contingent reasoning that are particularly natural, despite the absence of an obviously dominant strategy (Li, 2017). Following this approach, we construct a dynamic game that implements the Top Trading Cycles allocation under a notion of local obvious dominance that captures a form of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Keywords: Weak dominance; obvious dominance; strategy-proofness; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-sea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_working_paper/2/ Full text (text/plain)
Working Paper: Local Dominance (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:smuesw:2021_001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics and Statistics Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics 90 Stamford Road, Sigapore 178903. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cheong Pei Qi ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).