Local Dominance

Emiliano Catonini and Jingyi Xue

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We define notions of dominance between two actions in a dynamic game. Local dominance considers players who have a blurred view of the future and compare the two actions by first focusing on the outcomes that may realize at the current stage. When considering the possibility that the game may continue, they can only check that the local comparison is not overturned under the assumption of "continuing in the same way" after the two actions (in a newly defined sense). Despite the lack of forward planning, local dominance solves dynamic mechanisms that were found easy to play and implements social choice functions that cannot be implemented in obviously-dominant strategies.

Date: 2020-12, Revised 2023-04
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.14432 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Local Dominance (2020)
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