Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation

Silvester Van Koten and Andreas Ortmann

No 2014/114, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Self-regulatory organizations; Governmental oversight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 G18 G28 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Related works:
Chapter: Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2016)
Working Paper: Self-Regulatory Organizations Under the Shadow Of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
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