Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation

Andreas Ortmann

EUI-RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Abstract: Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.

Date: 2014-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Chapter: Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2016)
Working Paper: Self-Regulatory Organizations Under the Shadow Of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0412

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