Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new "finitistic" infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.

Keywords: discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium correspondence; payoff security; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2011-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement (2013)
Working Paper: Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201128

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