Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 54, issue 1, 26 pages

Abstract: We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new “finitistic” infinite-game generalization of Selten’s (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975 ) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium correspondence; Equilibrium refinement; Finite approximation; Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; Limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (2012)
Working Paper: Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0727-x

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