Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new "finitistic" infinite-game generalization of Selten's [24] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.

Keywords: discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium correspondence; better-reply security; equilibrium refinement; limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012-10-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Forthcoming in Economic Theory

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Related works:
Journal Article: Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement (2013)
Working Paper: Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201206

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