Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers

Chiara Fumagalli (), Massimo Motta () and Lars Persson

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer’s acceptance than in the case where entry can occur only by installing new capacity. Third, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas de-novo entry would be socially optimal (ii) it may deter entry altogether. Finally, we show that when exclusive deals include a commitment to future prices, they will increase welfare.

Keywords: Countervailing Power; Exclusion; Buyers’ Fragmentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers (2009)
Working Paper: Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:153

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