Partial Language Competence
Jeanne Hagenbach and
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Jeanne Hagenbach: Département d'économie
Frédéric Koessler: Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics (PSE)
No 2019-08, Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po
This paper proposes an equilibrium concept, Language-Based Expectation Equilibrium, which accounts for partial language understanding in sender-receiver cheap talk games. Each player is endowed with a privately known language competence which represents all the messages that he understands. For the messages he does not understand, he has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium strategies of the other player. In general, a language-based expectation equilibrium outcome differs from Nash and communication equilibrium outcomes, but is always a Bayesian solution. Partial language competence of the sender rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and facilitates information transmission from a moderately biased sender.
Keywords: Analogy-based expectations; Bayesian solution; Bounded rationality, cheap talk; Language; Pure persuasion; Strategic information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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