Experimental Design to Persuade
Anton Kolotilin ()
No 2013-17, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales
A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. I show that the sender optimally discloses only whether the receivers utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the senders and receivers welfare to be monotonic in information. Most notably, the senders welfare increases with the precision of the senders potential information and decreases with the precision of public information.
Keywords: information; disclosure; persuasion; stochastic orders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Experimental design to persuade (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-17
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