Persuasion Meets Delegation
Anton Kolotilin () and
No 2018-06, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales
There are two common ways for a principal to influence the decision making of an agent. One is to manipulate the agent's information (persuasion problem). Another is to limit the agent's decisions (delegation problem). We show that, under general assumptions, these two problems are equivalent; so solving one problem solves the other. We illustrate how the methods developed in the persuasion literature can be applied to address unsolved delegation problems by considering monopoly regulation with a participation constraint.
Keywords: persuasion; delegation; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2020)
Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-06
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