Persuasion Meets Delegation

Anton Kolotilin and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent - solving one solves the other. We use tools from the persuasion literature to generalize and extend many results in the delegation literature, as well as to address novel delegation problems, such as monopoly regulation with a participation constraint.

Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.02628 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2025)
Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2024)
Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1902.02628

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