On the Role of the Governmental Agreement in Breaking Political Deadlocks

Robert Dur and Otto Swank ()

No 97-023/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Political Economy', 1998, 14(3), 561-572.

Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, our model provides an explanation for some perceived changes in the Dutch policy making process.

Keywords: Policy reform; Credibility; Government formation; Voting behaviour, Mid-term cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-02-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:19970023

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