The Political Economy of Regionalism

Sanjeev Goyal and Klaas Staal ()
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Klaas Staal: Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 00-014/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or toseparate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives tounite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on thewhole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessiveincentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope ofalternative political institutions and rules in overcoming thepotential inefficiency. Our paper also provides a wide range ofexamples to illustrate the different institutions used in actualpractice to resolve such problems.

Date: 2000-03-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of regionalism (2004)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Regionalism (2000)
Working Paper: The political economy of regionalism (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000014

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