Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

Eline C.M. van der Heijden, Jan Nelissen (), Jan Potters and Harrie A.A. Verbon
Additional contact information
Eline C.M. van der Heijden: Tilburg University
Harrie A.A. Verbon: Tilburg University

No 01-087/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon theunique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is thatthere are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange,respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not onlymutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examinewhether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected bythe move and matching structure of the game.

Keywords: experiments; reciprocity; trust; coordination; gift exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/01087.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory (2001)
Working Paper: Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory (2001)
Working Paper: Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory (1999)
Working Paper: Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010087

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().