Working for a Good Cause
Robert Dur and
Robin Zoutenbier
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Robin Zoutenbier: Erasmus University Rotterdam
No 11-168/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
This discussion paper has led to a publication in the Public Administration Review , 2014, 74(2), 144-155.
A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. Our results show that only those individuals who are willing to contribute to the welfare of others and, in addition, feel that by working in the public sector they contribute to a good cause are significantly more likely to work in the public sector. Our results are most pronounced for highly educated employees.
Keywords: public service motivation; altruism; mission preferences; sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 J45 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-25, Revised 2013-04-23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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https://papers.tinbergen.nl/11168.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Working for a Good Cause (2013) 
Working Paper: Working for a Good Cause (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110168
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