Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts
Bouke Klein Teeselink,
Rogier J. D. Potter van Loon (),
Martijn (M.J.) van den Assem () and
Dennie van Dolder
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Rogier J. D. Potter van Loon: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Martijn (M.J.) van den Assem: VU Amsterdam
No 18-101/IV, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
This paper examines how within-match variation in incentives affects the performance of darts players. The game of darts offers an attractive naturally occurring research setting, because performance can be observed at the individual level and without obscuring effects of risk considerations and behavior of others. We analyze four data sets covering a total of 29,381 darts matches of professional, amateur, and youth players. We find that amateur and youth players display a sizable performance decrease at decisive moments. Professional players appear less susceptible of such choking under pressure. Our results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance.
Keywords: incentives; choking under pressure; performance; darts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D91 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-28, Revised 2019-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-spo
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Journal Article: Incentives, performance and choking in darts (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180101
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