Reviving Joint Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard

Francesco Carli, Francesco Cecchi, Manuela Fritz, Robert Lensink and Burak Uras
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Manuela Fritz: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2026-007, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: microfinance; asymmetric joint liability; group leader; peer monitoring; strategic default; lab-in-the-field (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reviving Joint Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard (2026)
Working Paper: Reviving Joint Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard (2026)
Working Paper: Reviving Joint Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard (2025)
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