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Collusion in Experimental Bertrand Duopolies with Convex Costs: The Role of Information and Cost Asymmetry

Cédric Argenton and Wieland Müller

No 2009-87, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: Bertrand competition; convex costs; collusion; coordination; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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