Collusion under Yardstick Competition: An Experimental Study
Abdolkarim Sadrieh () and
Eric van Damme
No 2003-97, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation schemes, such as yardstick competition, can be undermined by collusion.The degree to which the regulated agents manage to collude will be affected by the particulars of the scheme.We hypothesize that in a repeated game setting schemes will be more prone to collusion the smaller are the rents to the agents in case they behave non-cooperatively.We illustrate the relevance of this hypothesis by means of an economic experiment in which we compare the efficiency of two performance evaluation schemes.
Keywords: performance evaluation; competition; efficiency; games; collusion; yardstick (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study (2004)
Working Paper: Collusion under yardstick competition: An experimental study (2004)
Working Paper: Collusion under Yardstick Competition: An Experimental Study (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:e0fc088e-1228-43e7-95d4-1db40b328097
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().