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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games with and without sidepayments. The parameters bound (a) the number of approx-imate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. The theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced pro les and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are then applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.

Keywords: cooperative games; clubs; local public goods; games without side payments (NTU games); large games; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1998-11-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS (1999) Downloads
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