APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS
Alexander Kovalenkov () and
Myrna Wooders
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partitionbalanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
Keywords: cooperative games; clubs; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games; NTU games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp634.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2003)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2002)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2001)
Working Paper: Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs (2000)
Working Paper: APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS (1999)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:634
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