APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without side payments and provide three no emptiness of approximate core theorems for games in parameterized collections. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact electiveness. The theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.

Keywords: cooperative games; clubs; local public goods; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 2008/twerp535rev.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2003)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2002)
Working Paper: APPROXIMATE CORES OF GAMES AND ECONOMIES WITH CLUBS (2002)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (2001)
Working Paper: Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs (2000)
Working Paper: Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:535

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