On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.

Keywords: Experiments; other-regarding preferences; inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-upt
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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13296/1/256.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked (2010)
Working Paper: On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:256

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