Active Owners and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

Uwe Jirjahn and Jens Mohrenweiser

No 2013-04, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that employees in establishments with active owners are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, we show that, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if active owners are present. Our findings conform to the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.

Keywords: Active Owner; Works Council Introduction; Works Council Dissolution; Liability of Newness; Employer Resistance to Change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J53 J54 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Active owners and the failure of newly adopted works councils (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:201304

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