Does Performance Pay Increase the Risk of Marital Instability?

Mehrzad B. Baktash, John Heywood and Uwe Jirjahn

No 2023-06, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper uses German survey data on married couples to examine the association of performance pay at work and subsequent separation or divorce. Despite extensive controls, performance pay remains associated with an increased probability of separation or divorce. Yet, the results are entirely gender specific. When husbands earn performance pay, no association with marital instability is found. When wives earn performance pay, the association is large and robust. This pattern persists across a variety of modeling choices and attempts to account for endogeneity. We argue that the pattern fits theoretical expectations and discuss the implications.

Keywords: Performance Pay; Separation; Divorce; Gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I31 J32 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does Performance Pay Increase the Risk of Marital Instability? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:202306

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